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Arbitrable Blind Quantum Computation
Go Sato,1 Takeshi Koshiba,2 and Tomoyuki Morimae3
1Division of Mathematics Electronics and Informatics,
Graduate School of Science and Engineering, Saitama University,
255 Shimo-Okubo, Sakura-ku, Saitama 338-8570, Japan
2Faculty of Education and Integrated Arts and Sciences,
Waseda University, 1-6-1 Nishiwaseda, Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo 169-8050, Japan
3Department of Computer Science, Gunma University,
1-5-1 Tenjin-cho, Kiryu-shi, Gunma 376-0052, Japan
Blind quantum computation is a two-party protocol which involves a server Bob who has rich
quantum computational resource and provides quantum computation service and a client Alice who
wants to delegate her quantum computation to Bob without revealing her quantum algorithms and
her input to (resp., output from) the algorithms. Since Bob may be truant and pretend to execute
some computation, Alice wants to verify Bob’s computation. Verifiable blind quantum computation
enables Alice to check whether Bob is cheating or not. If Bob is cheating and claims his innocence,
Alice can refute the denial of Bob’s cheating but she cannot persuade any others that Bob is cheating.
In this paper, we incorporate arbitrators as the third party into blind quantum computation to
resolve the above problem and give an arbitrable blind quantum computation scheme.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Ac, 03.67.Dd
I. INTRODUCTION
Secure computation involves several parties who want
to evaluate functions over their private inputs without
compromising the privacy. Since the notion of secure
computation was invented by Yao, there have been many
proposals to implement secure computation. The first
scheme by Yao [1] was realized as a combination of en-
crypted circuits (garbled circuits) to evaluate a function
and oblivious transfer protocols and its security relied
on an unproven computational complexity theoretic as-
sumption. Unfortunately, unconditionally secure com-
putation for general functionalities is impossible in the
classical setting [2] and even in the quantum setting
[3]. Thus, we have to consider special cases where un-
conditionally secure computation can be realized. As a
special case of secure computation, a protocol (BFK09
protocol) for unconditionally secure delegated computa-
tion was shown by Broadbent, Fitzsimons and Kashefi
[4]. Secure delegated computation in the quantum set-
ting (a.k.a. blind quantum computation (BQC)) is a
two-party protocol between a client (Alice) and a server
(Bob): Bob is capable of carrying out any quantum com-
putation and Alice wants to delegate her computational
tasks to Bob without revealing her secret, that is, her
algorithms and their inputs/outputs. After Broadbent
et al’s seminal work, BQC protocols in different settings
and model have been proposed [5–14].
While BQC protocols ensure Alice’s privacy, Alice may
not detect Bob’s cheating behaviors if Bob neglects Al-
ice’s request and pretends to execute her algorithm. To
overcome this problem, some BQC protocols support the
verifiability which enables to detect Bob’s dishonest be-
havior if Bob is cheating. The Fitzsimons-Kashefi pro-
tocol (FK12 protocol) [15] is a verifiable variant of the
BFK09 one and the Hayashi-Morimae protocol (HM15
protocol) [16] is a verifiable variant of the Morimae-Fujii
BQC one (MF13 protocol) [5]. If Alice can verify Bob’s
execution of Alice’s algorithm, there still exists a prob-
lem. Even if Alice finds Bob’s cheating behavior, Bob
may insist that he is innocent and that Alice rather tries
to ensnare him. For example, Alice pays a service fee
to Bob if Bob honestly provides the delegated computa-
tion service. On the other hand, Alice does not want to
pay anything if Bob is cheating. The cheating Bob may
charge Alice for his cheating service. Any person out-
side the protocol (e.g. the FK12 protocol or the HM15
protocol) cannot decide which one is honest.
The notion of verifiability given in [15] is what we
should call it private verifiability. We have observed that
the private verifiability does not resolve the above dis-
pute. To resolve this dispute problem, we rather need
a mechanism where any public outsider or the specific
third-party can verify if Bob honestly provides a dele-
2gated computation service. In [17], Honda proposes the
notion of public verifiability for BQC and provides a pub-
licly verifiable BQC protocol by using a classical compu-
tational cryptography, which relies on an unproven com-
putational assumption. In this paper, we take a different
approach from [17] and provide a protocol which does not
rely on computational assumptions. To do this, we incor-
porate arbitrators as the third party into the HM15 pro-
tocol and give an unconditionally-secure arbitrable blind
quantum computation protocol.
For BQC, there is another approach by using homo-
morphic encryptions. In the classical setting, Gentry de-
vised a fully homomorphic encryption [18]. Even in the
quantum settings, some possibilities of homomorphic en-
cryptions have been discussed [19, 20].
II. PRELIMINARIES
As mentioned, we will give an arbitrable blind quan-
tum computation protocol. First, we briefly review the
MF13 protocol on which we base our protocol. In our
protocol, we need a procedure (i.e., honesty test) to de-
cide if a given state is actually a graph state. For such an
honesty test, we may use the Morimae-Nagaj-Schuch test
(MNS16 test) [21] or tests in [16, 22, 23] and the secu-
rity can be proved by using quantum de Finetti The-
orem under measurements that are implementable by
fully-one-way local operations and classical communica-
tion (LOCC) [24].
A. MF13 and HM15 protocols
A client Alice has only a measurement device and a
server Bob prepares a resource state of measurement-
based quantum computation. For the MH13 protocol,
any resource state (e.g., two-dimensional cluster state or
three-dimensional cluster state for topological quantum
computation) can be used. The MH13 protocol is as fol-
lows: (1) Bob prepares a universal resource state; (2)
Bob sends a particle of the resource state to Alice via the
quantum channel; (3) Alice measures the particle with re-
spect to the basis which is determined by her algorithm.
They repeat (2) and (3) until the computation halts.
The HM15 protocol is a privately-verifiable version of
the MF13 protocol. In the HM15 protocol, Bob first
prepares k + 1 copies of the resource state (represented
as a bipartite graph). k out of k + 1 copies are used for
stabilizer tests for the verifiability. The remaining one
copy is used for the computation where Alice’s algorithm
is performed via the MF13 protocol.
B. Honesty Test
Morimae, Nagaj and Schuch [21] gave a verification
procedure (MNS16 test) that checks whether a given
quantum state |ψ〉 is close to a graph state |G〉. The
probability the MNS16 test passes is described as (1 +
〈ψ|G〉)/2. While the honesty test in [16] is for bipartite-
graph states, the MNS16 test and also tests in [22, 23] are
for any graph states. In the protocol description we will
show, we mention the MNS16 test for the honesty test.
Alternatively, we may use other tests in [16, 22, 23].
III. PROTOCOL
As in the standard BQC protocols, we assume that Al-
ice, a client, would like to securely delegate her computa-
tion to Bob, a server. We assume that Bob can prepare
a universal n-qubit graph state |G〉. Besides Alice and
Bob, we assume that there exists a trusted third-party
Charlie who acts as an arbitrator. In this paper, we as-
sume that Charlie always obeys the protocol and stands
neutral. Our protocol is given in Protocol 1.
For the protocol, we assume that k ≥ 4n2 − 1 and
m ≥ (2 ln 2)knn5. It is not essential that Charlie has
quantum memory in the protocol. If Charlie does not
have quantum memory, he can take the option in STEP
3. Moreover, if Alice considers that her private verifi-
cation suffices, Charlie does not have to be involved in
the protocol. In that case, Bob directly sends k +m+ 1
graph states to Alice in STEP 1; Alice applies a random
permutation to k + m + 1 graph states and discards m
graph states in STEP 2; and STEP 3 and STEP 6 can
be omitted.
Then, Protocol 1 satisfies the following two properties.
(Completeness)
If Bob sends |G〉⊗2k+m+1 to Alice (via Charlie), then
Alice passes the test with probability 1.
(Soundness)
If Alice passes the test, ρcomp satisfies 〈G|ρcomp|G〉 ≥
1− 1
n
with probability 1− 1
n
at least.
The completeness just comes from the construction of
Protocol 1. The soundness can be similarly discussed
as in [22]. For self-containment, we review a proof in
3Protocol 1 Arbitrable BQC protocol
STEP 1: Bob generates |G〉⊗2k+m+1 and sends them to
Charlie, where |G〉 is an n-qubit graph state.
STEP 2: Charlie applies a random permutation to 2k+m+1
graph states and discards m graph states.
STEP 3: Charlie keeps k graph states in his memory and
sends the remaining k + 1 graph states ρ to Alice. (Op-
tionally, Charlie may execute k MNS16 tests as in STEP
6. If the k tests are not passed, Charlie judges that Bob is
cheating.)
STEP 4: Alice receives a graph states ρ and applies the
MNS16 tests to randomly chosen k graph states from k+1
graph states ρ. Let ρcomp be the remaining one graph state.
Alice executes the algorithm on ρcomp by measuring the
particle with respect to the basis which is determined by
the description of Alice’s algorithm.
STEP 5: If those k tests pass, then Alice accepts the compu-
tation. Otherwise, Alice rejects the computation. Charlie
does not anything if Alice accepts.
STEP 6: If Alice rejects, then Charlie executes k MNS16
tests by using k graph states stored in his memory. If those
k tests are passed, Charlie judges that Alice is cheating.
Otherwise, Charlie judges that Bob is cheating.
Appendix.
On Eq.(A.1) in Appendix, we suppose that T is a
POVM for Alice in STEP 5. On the other hand, we can
provide another interpretation for Eq.(A.1) and consider
that T is a POVM for Charlie in STEP 6. Even in this
interpretation, we have a similar consequence. That is,
if Charlie passes the test, ρcomp satisfies 〈G|ρcomp|G〉 ≥
1− 1
n
with probability 1 − 1
n
at least. In other words, if
Alice accepts the computation, then Charlie can endorse
her acceptance. Thus, we can say that Charlie works as
an arbitrator.
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Appendix: Proof of the Soundness Property
First, for any n-qubit quantum state σ, we can show
that
Tr[(T⊗k ⊗Π⊥G)σ
⊗k+1] ≤
1
2n2
, (A.1)
4where T is a POVM which corresponds to a pass by the
honesty test and
Π⊥G = I
⊗n − |G〉〈G|.
Since
Tr(Tσ) =
1
2
+
1
2
〈G|σ|G〉,
we can say that
Tr(Π⊥Gσ) = 1− 〈G|σ|G〉
= 2(1− Tr(Tσ)).
Thus, we have
Tr[(T⊗k ⊗Π⊥G)σ
⊗k+1] = Tr(Tσ)kTr(Π⊥Gσ)
= 2Tr(Tσ)k(1− Tr(Tσ)).
When Tr(Tσ) = k
k+1
, the above takes the maximum
value
2
(
k
k + 1
)k (
1−
k
k + 1
)
≤
2
k + 1
≤
1
2n2
.
The remaining (k + 1) qubits quantum state ρ after the
trace-out can be obtained as follows by using the quan-
tum de Finetti theorem with respect to the one-way
LOCC norm
Tr[(T⊗k ⊗Π⊥G)ρ]
≤
∫
dµ(σ)Tr[(T⊗k ⊗Π⊥G)σ
⊗k+1] +
1
2
√
2k2n ln 2
m
≤
1
2n2
+
1
2n2
=
1
n2
.
Since
Tr[(T⊗k ⊗Π⊥G)ρ] = Tr(Π
⊥
Gρcomp)Tr(T
⊗kρ),
Tr(Π⊥Gρcomp) ≥
1
n
implies that Tr(T⊗kρ) ≤ 1
n
.
This means that If Alice accpets, then it holds that
〈G|ρcomp|G〉 ≥ 1 −
1
n
with probability 1 − 1
n
at least.
Thus the soundness holds.
